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Family, in various configurations, is protected under the United States constitution. 1 
Parents specifically have a fundamental right to raise their own children. 2 This right may only be 
overcome when the parents have been afforded due process and the governmental interest is 
especially compelling, such as where the child has been abused or neglected? The fundamental 
right is only protected if one is a legal parent.4 Parenthood is automatic at birth for women and 
may be conclusively presumed for married men. 5 Unwed biological fathers6 on the other hand 
face a myriad of challenges that deny many men recognition as a legal parent and the opportunity 
to form a social relationship with their children. 
Over the last seven decades the number of children born out of wedlock has steadily 
increased. 7 In 1940, less than five percent of children were born to women outside of marriage. 8 
Non-marital births peaked around fifty percent and remain above forty percent.9 Amongst 
African Americans, the number of children born out of wedlock is nearly double that of the 
population as a whole. 10 Today, a total of more than one and a half million children are born out 
of wedlock. 11 Despite changes in society and the vast increase in children born to unwed parents 
over the last seventy years, the United States Supreme Court has refused to recognize the 
1 See, e.g., Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) , Meyer v. Neb., 262 U.S. 390 (1923), Prince v. 
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
2 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
3 Santoskyv. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,753-4 (1982). 
4 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
5 Cal Fam Code§ 7540 (2012)~ N.J. Stat§ 9:3-45(a) (2012)~Michae/ H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
6 I use "unwed biological father" throughout the paper in reference to the male involved in the conception of 
children born out of wedlock. I am using this as a status that is distinct from being a "legal parent" This paper 
argues that the two should be synonymous and that unwed biological fathers should be per se legal parents. 
7 National Vital Statistics Report, Nonmarital Childbearing in the United States, 1940-99, Vol. 48 No. 16, Oct. 18, 
2000, figure 1 http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr48/nvs48 _16.pdf (last viewed 11122/12) ~ (The percentage has 
dipped downward in recent years and may level off at the current rate of roughly 40%). 
8 ld. 
9 National Vital Statistics Report, Births: Preliminary Data for 2011, Vol. 61 No.5, Oct 3, 2012 at 4. 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr611nvsr61_05.pdf (last viewed 11122/12). 
10 ld. at Table 1 (showing that 72.3% of non-Hispanic black women gave birth out of wedlock). 
11 Id. at Table 7 (Showing just over 1.6 million births to unmarried women.) 
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biological relationship between father and child as sufficient for a man to be a legal parent of his 
child. 12 
This paper lays out a framework for the redefinition of fatherhood based on the Equal 
Protection ofbiological relationships, recognizing all biological parents as legal parents of their 
children. Legal parenthood includes the right of recognition under the law, inheritance through 
intestacy, and standing to bring a wrongful death or survivor claim 13 . Parenthood also includes a 
presumption favoring biological relationships for custody of minor children. Recognition of 
unwed biological fathers as legal parents would guarantee them these rights to the same extent 
that these rights are afforded to biological mothers. 
Section one discusses the current United States Constitutional requirements for unwed 
biological fathers to be recognized as legal parents and afforded the same protection as biological 
mothers and married men. 14 In section two, the paper discusses the narrow view of family under 
the Irish Constitution and its impact on the rights afforded to unwed biological fathers in Ireland. 
Section three discusses the recognition of legal parenthood over the last several decades for 
unwed biological fathers in Canada based on their biological relationship with the child. Section 
four sets out a path for the United States to use the Equal Protection clause of the 14th 
Amendment and the reasoning of the Canadian Supreme Court to legally recognize and protect 
unwed biological fathers as parents. 
12 This paper will not attempt to unravel why the increase in births to unwed parents has occurred but rather sees the 
increase as an opportunity to rethink the legal protections afforded to the unwed fathers in these situations. 
13 This is not an exhaustive list of the rights of parenthood. This merely shows the kind of rights that the biological 
father would be entitled to through legal recognition as a parent 
14 This paper will be limited to heterosexual "natural" pregnancy and does not delve into the fascinating areas of 
reproductive technology, surrogacy, sperm donors, or any of the other evolving issues regarding parenthood in those 
situations. 
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I. The Current Interpretation of the United States Constitution 
Unnecessarily Requires a Biological and Social Relationship 
Between Unwed Biological Fathers and Their Children Before 
U owed Biological Fathers are Recognized as Legal Parents, 
Which Violates Equal Protection. 
The Supreme Court first recognized a limited due process right for unwed biological 
fathers in the 1970s. 15 The state of Illinois restricted parenthood so that unwed biological fathers 
were excluded. 16 When Stanley's paramour, and the mother ofthe children, passed away, the 
children became wards of the state because there was no one who fit the statutory definition of 
parent. 17 Stanley challenged the Illinois statute which conclusively presumed unwed fathers to 
be unfit as a violation of Equal Protection. 18 Instead of a direct answer to the Equal Protection 
claim, the Court circumvented the question by using Due Process to find that Stanley was 
entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a parent. 19 The Court concluded that because all other 
categories of parents were entitled to a hearing and unwed biological fathers under the statute 
were not, the statute violated Equal Protection. 20 The dissent challenged the majority decision 
for its Due Process analysis because Due Process was never raised in the courts below. 21 The 
dissent, using rational basis review in its Equal Protection analysis, found that the differences 
between an unwed mother and father were substantial, and therefore equal protection was not 
violated. 22 
15 Stanley, 405 U.S. 645. 
16 ld. at 650, citing ll1. Rev. Stat., c. 37, § 701-14 (Parent means the father and mother of a legitimate child, or the 
survivor of the~ or the natural mother of an illegitimate child, and includes any adoptive parent.) 
17 /d. at 646. 
18 /d. 
19 /d. at 650. 
20 /d. at 658. 
21 Id at 659 (C.J. Burger dissenting). 
22 ld. at 665 (Unwed mother is readily identifiable, generally from hospital records, and alternatively by physicians 
or others attending the child's birth. Unwed fathers, as a class, are not traditionally quite so easy to identify and 
locate) 
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At the time the Supreme Court decided Stanley, it had not yet applied heightened scrutiny 
to classifications based on gender under the Equal Protection clause. 23 Although the Court 
recognized some parental rights in Stanley, the majority opinion is troubling for unwed 
biological fathers. Under the Court's analysis, one group of potential parents, unwed biological 
fathers, must prove their fitness to parent in a hearing whereas all other groups are presumed 
fit. 24 The rights granted to unwed biological fathers are especially fragile and are dependent 
upon a finding that they meet a social construct of parenthood. For every other conceivable 
group of parent, the burden is upon the state to show them unfit. 
After Stanley, the Supreme Court held that the biological father's marital status with the 
mother of the child may be decisive as to whether the biological father has the ability to veto an 
adoption of his children. 25 The Court upheld the application of a Georgia statute which denied 
veto power over adoptions for unwed biological fathers. 26 The Supreme Court held that Due 
Process was satisfied by having a hearing in which the unwed biological father had an 
opportunity to show his parental fitness. 27 The Court dealt with the Equal Protection challenge 
in the most cursory of ways, stating merely that "We think appellant's interests are readily 
distinguishable from those of a separated or divorced father, and accordingly believe that the 
State could permissibly give appellant less veto authority than it provides to a married father. "28 
The Court required that an unwed biological father had to not only be fit but also show that he 
had satisfied a social relationship to warrant being a parent. 
:Jennifer Hendricks, Essentially a Mother, 13 Wm. & Mary J. of Women & L. 429,436 (2007) 
Stanley, 405 U.S. at 657. (Father must make showing of fitness) 
25 Quillon v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978). 
26 ld. at 249. 
27 I d. at 255. 
28 I d. at 256. 
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A year later, the Court struck down a New York statute that gave unwed mothers an 
absolute veto over adoptions but only gave unwed biological fathers an opportunity to show that 
the best interests ofthe child were not furthered by adoption, as a violation ofEqual Protection.29 
The Court found that the gender based distinction in the law violated Equal Protection, because 
some unwed fathers were capable of parenting. 30 The Court found the state interest in providing 
adoptive homes for illegitimate children insufficient and not furthered by the use of gender 
classifications. 31 The Court, however, explicitly stated that it was not answering the Equal 
Protection challenge as between married and unmarried men.32 
These cases have created what has been termed a "biology-plus-relationship" test to 
decide when an unwed biological father is recognized as a legal parent of his children.33 The 
Court consistently held that the biological relationship between the unwed father and the child 
was insufficient for the unwed biological father to claim parental rights?4 Instead, the unwed 
biological father is required to show a relationship that satisfies the Court's view of 
parenthood. 35 Parenthood has essentially been defined as motherhood, and for an unwed father 
to be a legal parent to his children, he must show that he has provided the nurture, care, and 
responsibility that is expected of mothers. 36 
29 Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979). 
30 I d. at 389. 
31 ld. at 391. 
32 ld. at 394 n.l6. (Presumably the state would have an easier job satisfying equal protection as between married 
and unmarried because neither is a subject class requiring a heightened scrutiny analysis. In section 4 I discuss 
whether unwed biological fathers could successfully gain equal rights with married fathers by raising and having the 
court actually answer this question). 
33 Hendricks, supra note 21, at 433. 
34 See, Stanley, 405 U.S. 655.; Quillon, 434 U.S. 246.; Caban, 441 U.S. 380. 
35 Hendricks, supra note 21, at 431. 
36ld. 
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The biology-plus-relationship test was first recognized in Stanley.31 Stanley was able to 
show that he lived in the same home with the children and their mother?8 The dissent makes a 
point of noting that Stanley was "unusual" compared to other unwed biological fathers. 39 In 
essence, the Court was making an exception to the normal case where an unwed biological father 
would be unable to meet the relationship requirement. In Quillon, the father failed to meet the 
test. The relationship with the child had been minimal. 40 The father failed the relationship test 
therefore,41 the court terminated the legal relationship42 between father and child and for all 
practical purposes, severed the possibility of a social relationship. The Court in Caban labored 
over the details of the relationship. The father had lived in the home with the children and their 
mother for a period of time and had acted the part of a parent and therefore was recognized in 
law as someone with a cognizable right as a parent. 43 Stanley and Caban were rewarded in part 
because their relationship with the mother of their children lasted after the birth of the child, 
allowing for them to form the required social relationship. The biology-plus-relationship test 
places the parental rights of unwed biological fathers at the mercy of their being informed of the 
pregnancy and given an opportunity to form a social relationship with the child. This is contrary 
to women who are parents based on their biological relationship with the child. 
The biology-plus-relationship test is especially problematic for unwed biological fathers, 
who like Quillon, may not fill the role of social parent, but seek to retain the legal recognition. 
The test creates a perverse incentive for women to keep the unwed biological father from having 
37 Stanley, 405 U.S. 645. 
38 !d. at 646. 
39 I d. at 666 (White, J. dissenting). 
40 Quillon, 434 U.S. at 250-51. (describing the intermittent relationship between biological father and child). 
41 I d. at 256. (The Court seems to suggest in dicta that actual or legal custody, or significant responsibility over the 
daily supervision, education, protection or care is required for the biological father to satisfy the necessary 
relationship component.) 
42 Id at 256. (The father had paid child support intermittently up to this point. This ceased with the adoption) 
43 Caban, 441 U.S. at 389. 
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the opportunity to form a social relationship with his children. The biology-plus-relationship test 
has denied a biological father the legal recognition as a parent, when the mother deliberately 
refused the biological father the opportunity form a social relationship. 44 In Lehr, the biological 
mother concealed the child from the biological father. 45 The Supreme Court held that biology 
only creates the opportunity to form a social relationship but does not grant any constitutionally 
protected rights without a social relationship.46 The Court held that the putative father registry47 
provided adequate protection to unwed biological fathers, because it provided notice and an 
opportunity to be heard if the father fit in one of the enumerated categories.48 However in Lehr, 
a paternity action was pending, known both to the court and the mother, and the biological 
mother knew who the biological father was. However, because the biological father did not fit 
into one of the enumerated categories under the statute, he was not legally entitled to notice or an 
opportunity to be heard in the adoption proceeding. 49 The Court's recognition of a putative 
father registry as sufficient to protect the due process rights of unwed biological fathers has led 
44 Lehrv. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983). 
45 I d. at 269, (White J., dissenting). 
46 ld. at 261-2. 
47 I d. at 252, n.5. 
48 NY CLS Dom Rei§ 111-a (2012). The seven categories enumerated by NY law: 
2. Persons entitled to notice, pursuant to subdivision one of this section, shall include: 
(a) any person adjudicated by a court in this state to be the father of the child; 
(b) any person adjudicated by a court of another state or territory of the United States to be the father of the child, 
when a certified copy of the court order has been filed with the putative father registry, pursuant to section three 
hundred seventy-two-c of the social services law~ 
(c) any person who has timely filed an unrevoked notice of intent to claim paternity of the child, pursuant to section 
three hundred seventy-two-c of the social services law; 
(d) any person who is recorded on the child's birth certificate as the child's father; 
(e) any person who is openly living with the child and the child's mother at the time the proceeding is initiated and 
who is holding himself out to be the child's father, 
(f) any person who has been identified as the child's father by the mother in written, sworn statement; 
(g) any person who was married to the child's mother within six months subsequent to the birth of the child and prior 
to the execution of a surrender instrument or the initiation of a proceeding pursuant to section three hundred eighty-
four-b of the social services law; and 
(h) any person who has filed with the putative father registry an instrwnent acknowledging paternity of the child, f
9
ursuant to section 4-1.2 of the estates, powers and trusts law. 
Lehr, 463 U.S. at 252-3. 
Woyce7 
to the adoption of such registries across the country. 50 Such registries, however, only provide an 
opportunity to be heard to those who know of the existence of the registries and have availed 
themselves of the protections. These registries fail to provide unwed biological fathers equal 
treatment under the law, as they offer no guarantee of parental rights. 
Even when unwed biological fathers establish and maintain a social relationship with 
their children, they may be denied parental rights categorically if the mother of their child is 
married to another man. California's irrebuttable presumption that all children born within a 
marriage were conclusively the husbands was challenged as a violation ofDue Process. 51 The 
Court found that the irrebuttable presumption expresses and furthers the state policy52 and 
therefore procedurally the presumption is not unconstitutional. 53 The biological father also 
challenged the statute under substantive due process, asserting a liberty interest in his child based 
on the social relationship that existed. 54 The Supreme Court majority held that the biology-plus-
relationship test that had been used in prior cases had an additional, though unexpressed, factor: 
sanctity afforded to family units. 55 Ultimately because relationships between unmarried 
biological fathers and their children born to married woman is not a traditionally protected 
interest, the court held that the biological father had no protected fundamental right to raise his 
5° Currently 31 states have putative father registries. e.g. see (Code of Ala.§ 26-10C-1 (2012); A.R.S. § 8-106.01 
(2012); A.C.A § 20-18-702 (2012); 13 Del. C.§ 8-402 (2012); Fla. Stat.§ 63.054 (2012); O.C.G.A § 19-11-9 
(2012); Idaho Code§ 16-1513 (2012); 750 ILCS 50/12.1 (2012); Bums Ind Code Ann.§ 31-19-5-5 (2012); Iowa 
Code§ 144.12A (2012); K.S.A § 23-2204 (2011); La. R.S. 9:400 (2012); ALM GL ch. 209C, § 2 (2012); Minn. 
Stat. § 259.52 (2012); MCLS § 710.33 (2012); § 192.016 RS.Mo. (2012); Mont Code Anno.,§ 42-2-206 (2011); 
R.RS. Neb.§ 43-104.01 (2012); RSA 170-B:6 (2012); N.M. Stat Ann.§ 32A-5-20 (2012); NY CLS Soc Serv § 
372-c (2012); ORC Ann. 3107.062 (2012); 10 Old. St.§ 7506-1.1 (2012); ORS § 109.450 (2011); 23 Pa.C.S. § 
2921 (2012); Tenn. Code Ann.§ 36-2-318 (2012); Tex. Fam. Code§ 160.402 (2012); Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-6-
144 (2012); Va Code Ann.§ 63.2-1249 (2012); Wyo. Stat.§ 1-22-117 (2012).) 
51 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 116-7 (1989). (The court explicitly notes that it does not reach the equal 
~rotection claim because it was not raised below.) 
2 I d. at 119-20. (The state interest is the protection of the marital family unit) 
53 Jd. 
54 ld. at 120. 
55 ld. at 123. 
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child. 56 Justice Steven's concurrence suggests that not all rights for the biological father are 
eliminated and that a right to visitation may still be possible. 57 However, the effect was that an 
unwed biological father has become a "quasi-parent" with visitation rights greater than the public 
but is not himself a legally recognized parent. 58 Although the unwed biological father had done 
everything possible to become a parent of his child, he was denied legal recognition because the 
mother was already married. Women who have children with married men face no such denial 
of legal recognition. It is unwed biological fathers alone who are denied legal recognition as 
parents because of their marital status. 
Currently in the United States, the Constitution has been held to only offer limited legal 
recognition to the parental rights to unwed biological fathers. The Court requires a biological 
and a social relationship, and after Michael H, a traditionally protected interest. The Court has 
consistently avoided a direct equal protection analysis and instead has relied on due process, 
granting merely a right to notice and an opportunity to be heard. This has led to a denial of the 
recognized fundamental right to parent one's own child. A direct Equal Protection analysis 
offers the opportunity to guarantee to unwed biological fathers the same protection of their 
fundamental right to parent as is offered to all women and to married biological fathers. 
n. Ireland's Narrow Conception of "Family" Denies 
Constitutional Protection to the Parental Rights of U owed 
Biological Fathers, and Should Serve as a Warning for the 
Continued Use of Classifications Based on Marital Status. 
Unlike the United States where familial interests had to be found through the Due Process 
clause, the Irish Constitution explicitly protects the family unit. 59 The State recognizes family as 
"the natural primary and fundamental unit group of society, and as a moral institution possessing 
56 ld. at 125. 
57 Id. at 133 (Stevens J., concurring). 
58 Hendricks, supra, at 457-8. (Offering an analysis of Troxel if applied to Michael H.). 
5~R. CONST., 1937, art. 41.1-3. 
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inalienable and imprescriptible rights, antecedent and superior to all positive law."6° Family 
however, is limited to the marital unit under the interpretation of the Irish courts.61 Cohabitation 
is insufficient for full constitutional protection. 62 
Under the Irish system, parents with children outside of marriage are not granted 
protections under Art. 41.1. 63 The mother of such a child takes custody and guardianship under 
statutory law64 and has limited Constitutional protection. 65 By contrast the biological father has 
no constitutional rights to his children born outside of marriage. 66 
An unwed biological father has certain statutory rights that fall short of actual parentage. 
If the biological mother of the child consents, both mother and father can file a statutory 
declaration granting the biological father guardianship.67 Absent consent, the biological father 
may seek a court order for guardianship.68 Guardianship for unwed biological fathers pursuant 
to either method may be revoked by court order, thus creating a weaker right than that for 
married fathers. 69 
The Irish Supreme Court has stated that the "blood link" is of little weight in determining 
the rights biological fathers have with their children. 70 The limited weight given to biology has 
led to the biological father only having a right to apply for guardianship, not an actual right to 
60 IR. CONST., 1937, art. 41.1 
61 The State (Nicolaou) v. An Bord Uchtala, (1966] IR. 567 at643-44. 
62 ld. 
63 ld. 
64 Guardianship of Infants Act of 1964 (Act No. 7/1964) (lr.), available at 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1964/en/act/pub/0007/index.html. 
65G. v. An Bord Uchtala, [1982) IR. 32 at 55. 
66 [1966] IR. 567. 
67 supra n63, Section 2( 4) of the Guardianship of Infants Act I 964, as amended by, section 4 of 
The Children Act of 1997 (Act. No. 40/1997) (lr. ), available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1997/enlact/pub/0040/index.html. 
68 
supra n63, Section 6A(1) of the Guardianship of Infants Act 1964, as inserted by, section 12 
of the Status of Children Act 1987 (Act No. 27/1987) (lr.), available at 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1987/enlact/pub/0026/index.html. 
69 GoV'T ofiR., LEGAL AsPECTS ofFAMILY RELATIONSHIPS (2009), available at 
http://www.lawreform.ie/ _ fileupload/consultationo/o20papers/Cpofo20FamilyG/o20Relationshipso/o2031-08-
09o/o20includingG/o20cover. pdf. 
70 JK v VW [1990] 2 IR 437. 
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guardianship.71 A large majority of unwed fathers seeking guardianship are granted 
guardianship; however the right to be a parent is something that should not be at the discretion of 
a court.72 
One avenue available to unwed biological fathers in Ireland is to seek recourse before the 
European Court of Justice by bringing a claim under Article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. 73 A biological father who was found fit by a circuit court in Ireland sought 
guardianship of his daughter?4 The initial grant of guardianship was overturned by the Supreme 
Court of Ireland, which reaffirmed that the biological father merely has the right to petition for 
such guardianship and not a right to guardianship. 75 The Supreme Court laid out a test that stated 
regard should not be had to the objective of satisfying the wishes 
and desires of the father to be involved in the guardianship of and 
to enjoy the society of his child unless the Court has first 
concluded that the quality of welfare which would probably be 
achieved for the infant by its present custody which is with the 
prospective adoptive parents, as compared with the quality of 
welfare which would probably be achieved by custody with the 
father is not to an important extent better. 76 
When remanded, the High Court of Ireland found that the socio-economic differences 
between the adoptive parents and the biological father should not be defining, but still found that 
the security enjoyed by the child in a 'family' recognized by the Constitution would be lost if the 
child was placed in the care of her biological father.77 The biological father appealed to the 
71 ld. 
72
supra 68, n26 (In 2008 there were 2,448 applications and 283 or 11.56% were denied.) 
73 Art. 8, ECHR. (Article 8 states: Right to respect for private and famlly life 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his 
private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise 
of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the countty, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.) 
74 Keegan v. Ireland, (1994) 18 EH.RR 342, at ~9, (1994] Eur. Ct. H.R 16969/90, at~ 9. 
75 /d. at ~12. 
76 ld. 
77 ld. at ~14. 
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Commission claiming that Article 8 was violated where he as a biological parent had neither 
Constitutional right to guardianship nor a right to be heard at the adoption of his child. 78 
The European Court first found that a protected family existed outside of marriage under 
Article 8, despite Ireland's insistence that family is only a protected entity within marriage. 79 
The Court held that Art. 8 was violated because of the obstacles created in Irish law that 
prevented a biological father from achieving guardianship of his child. 80 The Court focused on 
the placing of the child for adoption shortly after birth without the consent or notice of the 
biological father, which denied him the right to form any bonds with his child. Ultimately 
however, the recourse was mere monetary damages for the loss of a child, as the European Court 
had no authority to demand the return of the child to the biological father. 81 
Shortly after Keegan, the Irish Supreme Court had an opportunity to once more rethink 
its treatment of unwed biological fathers. The Court again rejected the idea that the biological 
father's fitness was the touchstone of the inquiry for guardianship and reasserted that all that is 
granted under the statutory provisions is a right to petition for guardianship. 82 The Court stated 
that where the unwed biological father and mother have a stable relationship and the father 
nurtures the child in a situation nearly analogous to the constitutionally protected family (absent 
marriage), the biological father's social relationship would cause his rights to be significant. 83 
However, the biological link remains entitled to little weight. The Irish Supreme Court also 
refused to recognize the European Court of Justice's opinion as part of Irish domestic law and 
continued to reject Constitutional protection for a de facto family relationship. 84 This holding 
78 ld. at ~31. 
79 Id at ~44. 
80 ld at~48. 
81 !d. at ~66-68. 
82 W O'R vEH, [1996] 2 IR. 248. 
83/d. 
84/d. 
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leaves unwed biological fathers in Ireland without a Constitutional right to be parents and 
without a recourse to enforce European Court of Justice opinions in the Irish Court system. 
Ireland has a system whereby the unwed biological father is not a parent nor is he 
protected under the Constitution. The only right such a man has is to petition the court for 
guardianship where his fitness will not be a controlling factor. The constraints on family under 
the Constitution work to deny unwed fathers the ability to form the lasting social relationship 
that the Court requires when granting guardianship. The guardianship right that is available to 
unwed biological fathers is revocable, thus forever keeping unwed biological fathers in an 
unstable legal relationship with their children. The Irish system makes no attempt to recogriize 
equal parental rights based on biology, but instead has a multi-tiered system in which unwed 
biological fathers are on the bottom rung. 
Ireland's narrow conception of'family' and its tying of the fundamental right to parent 
one's biological children to the marital status of the parents should serve as a dire warning and is 
not a model to be followed. The United States model has come perilously close to this Irish 
model regarding the rights of unwed biological fathers who have children with women married 
to another man. Refusing to recognize the biological tie between the unwed father and the child 
is an unacceptable result. The Irish system is unabashedly unequal in its treatment of unwed 
biological fathers. The United States Constitution guarantees everyone the Equal Protection of 
the law and can no longer maintain a system analogous to that which exists in Ireland. 
Ill. Canada's Journey to Legal Recognition of the Dignity Interest 
in the Biological Relationship Between U owed Biological 
Fathers and Their Children Regardless of the Social 
Relationship Currently in Existence. 
For nearly three decades, the Canadian courts had no leading decision on unwed 
biological fathers' parental rights, leading to little consistency or predictability when unwed 
Woyce 13 
biological fathers challenged specific statutory provisions or court proceedings. 85 Over roughly 
the last decade, however, it appears that this has begun to change and that a system more 
protective of biological ties has gained both political acceptance and legal recognition by the 
courts. 86 This section will first briefly discuss the wide range of holdings to early statutory 
challenges. It will then tum to the Charter-based challenges and the modem trend towards a 
broader acceptance ofunwed biological fathers' parental rights based on biology alone. 
Two early cases established that unwed biological fathers could petition and gain custody 
of their children where a social relationship existed.87 In Lyttle, the father lived with the mother 
and their children for two years before the mother left with the children. 88 The mother placed the 
children for adoption and the biological father didn't find out until after the period for contesting 
the wardship order had elapsed. 89 He challenged the wardship order on grounds that he had 
received no notice, and therefore the order should be void. 90 The court upheld his claim, voided 
the wardship order, and stopped the adoption process. 91 Similarly, in Gingell, a father who had 
lived with his children was able to have them returned to his custody after the mother took the 
children and abandoned them for adoption. 92 These two cases revolved around the "social" 
relationship that the biological father had established through cohabitation with his children, not 
the biological ties between father and child. 93 Courts at this time were careful to be clear that 
85 Lori Chambers, New Born Adoption: Birth Mothers. Genetic Fathers. And Reproductive Autonomy, 26 Can. J. 
fam. L. 339, 361-63 (2010). 
86 /d. at 382-83. 
87 Id. at 361-62, citing, Children 'sAid Society of Metropolitan Toronto v. Lyttle ,[1973] SCR 568; R. v. Gingell, 
(1976] 2 SCR 86. (The facts of both these cases are taken as related by Chambers because both cases are only in 
French.) 
88 Chambers, supra n.84, at 361. 
89 Id. 
90 ld. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 361-62. 
93 I d. at 362. 
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they were not protecting all biological fathers, but only those who had established a sufficient 
social relationship. 94 
The focus in Lyttle on the social relationship led one court to find that where the mother 
is placing an infant, as opposed to an older child, for adoption the unwed biological father is not 
entitled to notice. 95 In reaching its conclusion, the court focused on the statutory amendments to 
the definition ofparent.96 The biological father in Ward was not listed on the birth certificate 
and never established a social relationship with his child, therefore he was not a legal parent and 
not entitled to notice of the adoption under the statute.97 The court interpreted the statute strictly 
as laying out the only possibilities for a biological father to establish himself as a parent.98 
This same court once again had an opportunity to determine the rights of the biological 
father under a newly revised statute just a few years after Ward. 99 It first held that the statutory 
definition was not an exhaustive list for defining parent and that a person who did not meet the 
criteria therein could still be considered a parent. 100 To bolster its conclusion, the Court referred 
to the Children's Law Reform Act of 1977, which recognizes each child as having natural 
94 Child Welfare Act (Re) (Alta CA), [1986] AJ No 303. 
95 ReWard, [1975] OJ No 2357. 
96Id. ("(e) "parent" means a person who is under a legal duty to provide for a child, or a guardian or a person 
standing in loco parentis to a child, other than a person appointed for the purpose under this Act, but where a child is 
born out of wedlock means the mother of the child and, 
(i) a person who is under a legal duty to provide for the child pursuant to an order of a court of competent 
jurisdiction or pursuant to a written agreement, or 
(ii) a person who, having acknowledged a parental relationship to the child, has provided or cared for the child" 
97 [1975] OJ No. 2357. 
98 ld. 
99 The Child Welfare Act, 1978 (Ont.), c. 85. (Defines parent in §69-1 as "(a) a guardian; 
(b) a person who has demonstrated a settled intention to treat a child as a child of the person's family; and 
(c) a person who is not recognized in law to be a parent of a child but, 
(i) has acknowledged a parental relationship to the child and has voluntarily provided for the child's care and 
support 
(ii) by an order of a court of competent jurisdiction [**13] or a written agreement, is under a legal duty to provide 
for the child or has been granted custody of or access to the child, or 
(iii) has made a written acknowledgment of the fact of his or her parentage to the adoption agency or licensee under 
subsection 5 of section 60 placing the child for adoption, but does not include the Crown, a society or a foster parent 
of a child." 
100 Re MLA., [1979] 25 O.R (2d) 779, 786. 
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parents101 and presumes that the biologically related male is the father. 102 The Court, therefore, 
held that the biological father is a parent under the law and is entitled to notice and his consent is 
required in an adoption proceeding. 103 The court tempered its holding by acknowledging that 
some biological fathers would not be entitled to notice based on the circumstances. 104 The Court 
then remanded all four petitions that were at issue in the consolidated appeal so that notice could 
be given to all four biological fathers and consent obtained. 105 The expanded definition of 
parent that is protected here offers an unwed biological father who has not established a social 
relationship with his child, legal recognition, seemingly in direct contradiction to the statutory 
language and the holding of Ward This set the Canadian courts closer to an equal understanding 
of parental rights. 
The first Charter-based challenge came in 1986 and claimed discrimination on sex and 
marital status. 106 The court recognized what it called a "startling" difference in treatment for 
biological fathers depending on their marital status107 and that gender distinctions were drawn 
based on nurturing roles. 108 The Court upheld the challenge, theoretically opening the door for 
broader rights to be granted to unwed biological fathers. 109 After this case, unwed biological 
fathers began to bring genetic-based claims with mixed success. 
101 Children's Law Reform Ac~ 1977 (Ont), c41. §1"1. ... for all purposes of the law of Ontario a person is the 
child of his or her natural parents and his or her status as their child is independent of whether the child is born 
within or outside marriage." 
102 /d. at §8(1) "Unless the contrary is proven on a balance of probabilities, there is a presumption that a male person 
is, and he shall be recognized in law to be, the father of a child ... " 
103 [1979] 25 O.R. (2d) 779, at 787-88. 
104 /d. at 790. (Specifically the court recognizes that in the case of rape or a sperm donor notice and consent would 
not be required.) 
105 /d. at 798-800. 
106 Re MacVicar and Superintendent ofFamily and Child Services (1986), 34 D.LR (4th) 488 
107 /d. at ~31. 
108 I d. at ~35. 
109 /d. at ~38. 
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In Ontario, an unwed biological father of a child born of a casual relationship was granted 
permission to challenge his lack of notice to an adoption proceeding. 110 The divisional court, 
however, found that the mother and father were not similarly situated and that the biological 
mother had "demonstrated responsibility" in a way the biological father had not during the 
pregnancy. 111 The government argued that the distinction was based upon the responsibility 
undertaken and not the sex of the parties. 112 On the other hand, the Nova Scotia court held that 
the legislature had not intended to deprive a child of a relationship with the biological father and 
therefore, the biological father's custody claim should be allowed, although he had no social 
relationship with the child. 113 
Another Canadian court held that the mother is the sole legal guardian of the child 
immediately after birth and therefore can place the child up for adoption without the consent of 
the biological father. 114 The Court was faced with continued domestic violence and the adoptive 
parents' desire for an open adoption. 115 Thus, in making its determination to uphold the adoption 
without the consent of the biological father, the court explicitly made reference to the possibility 
of a social relationship between the biological father and his daughter in the future. 116 
British Colombia's decision that the mother has immediate sole custody can be contrasted 
with the Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench, which required a search for the father two years 
after the children were placed with an adoptive family. 117 The Court questioned the motives of 
the mother and her judgment in denying both the biological father and his children the right to 
11° CESv Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, [1988] OJ No 268 at ~4. 
111 I d. at ~15. 
112 Id. 
113 DT (Re), [ 1992] NSJ No 387, at ~46. 
114 JNZ v JD, [1994} BCJ No 969. 
115 I d. at ~12-15. 
116 I d. at ~97. 
117 RA (Re), [1998] MJ No 348. 
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have a social or legal relationship or to know of each other's existence. 118 The court further 
found the rights granted under the putative father registry to be illusory where, as here, the 
biological father is never informed of the pregnancy. 119 
The unpredictability for unwed biological fathers continued in 2000 when the British 
Colombia Appeals Court overturned the district court's granting of custody to a biological father 
in favor of an adoptive family. 120 The unwed biological father had filled out the registry and 
sought custody of his child. 121 On appeal by the adoptive family, the court found that the lower 
court had given too much weight to the biological ties between the father and child and thus 
reversed and granted the adoption, forever severing the father's relationship to his child. 122 
Despite the varied results of these challenges, in 2001, unwed biological fathers won an 
important victory for biological ties. 123 The biological father sought to have his surname 
included on the child's birth registration. 124 The mother filed the registration with only her own 
surname. 
125 The Supreme Court of Canada found that the Vital Statistics Statute, 126 which 
allowed for the mother to not acknowledge the biological father without reason, was a violation 
of the Charter freedoms. 127 Having found a dignity interest in the right to having one's children 
bear one's surname, 128 the court held that the statute intruded on this dignity interest in an 
impermissible manner. 129 The ultimate effect ofthis case was to recognize the biological 
father's biological relationship to his children, absent a social relationship, as significant and 
118 I d. at ,49. 
119 I d. at ,36. 
120 Birth Registration No. 99-00733, Re, 133 B.C.A.C. 193. 
121 I d. at ,1-16. 
122 ld. at 116. 
123 Trociukv. British Columbia, 2001 BCCA 368. 
124 Jd. at ,5. 
125 I d. at ,2. 
126 Vital Statistics Act, RS.B.C. 1996, c. 479. 
127 2001 BCCA 368, at ,13. 
128 I d. at ,16. 
129 I d. at ,37. 
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worthy of protection under the Canadian Charter. This had an immediate and profound impact 
on biological fathers' rights. 
Shortly after Trociuk, an unwed biological father who had no social relationship with his 
child sought notice and custody after an adoption proceeding had begun in an Ontario Court. 130 
The biological father did not fit any of the statutory criteria for parenthood;131 however, the court 
held that had a procedure existed that included the father in the birth registration forms, he would 
have fit within the statutory definition. 132 The Court, using Trociuk, found that the biological 
father was a parent entitled to notice because of the biological relationship. 133 
While biology is sufficient for a biological father to be recognized as a parent, it remains 
merely a factor for purposes of custody. The Saskatchewan Court of Queen's Bench awarded 
custody to adoptive parents despite finding that the biological father was a fit parent who did not 
consent.134 After the mother denied knowing who the father was and signed a consent agreement 
for adoption, 135 the biological father engaged the media in order to find his child. 136 DNA tests 
proved that the petitioner was the biological father. 137 Despite a finding that the biological father 
and his paramour were "adequate,"138 the court spent twenty seven paragraphs discussing the 
shortcomings ofthe couple. 139 The court then extolled the virtues ofthe adoptive family. 140 The 
Court concluded that "the best interest" standard is not satisfied by placing the child with the 
130 DGCvRHGY, [2003] 65 OR (3d) 563. 
131 I d. at ~8. 
132 I d. at ~11. 
133Jd. 
134 Hendricks v Swan, [2007] S.J. No. 30; 2007 SKQB 36. 
135 I d. at ~18. 
136 I d. at ~21. 
137 ld at ~23. 
138 I d. at ~54. 
139 I d. at ~29-56 .. 
140 I d. at ~57-65. 
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"adequate" biological father and therefore allowed the adoption. 141 Although the Court allowed 
visitation by the biological father, 142 the full rights of parenthood were denied merely because of 
his gender. No biological mother is forced to undergo an examination to show her fitness nor 
could she lose her parental rights where she is found "adequate" by a court. Despite the 
Saskatchewan Court's lip-service to the inviolability of parental rights143 and equality144, this 
decision suggests that biological father's must be more than "adequate" in order to be granted 
custody of their own children. 
Canada has a system that looks to the dignity interest that an unwed biological father has 
in his children. Canada recognizes that all parents, regardless of gender or marital status, have 
the same dignity interest when it comes to having an opportunity to raise their own children. 
Canada's federal system has led to conflicting results, however, over the last decade. The current 
trend is the recognition that the biological relationship that an unwed father shares with his 
children is sufficient for him to be recognized as a parental figure. Parental recognition has been 
used to allow unwed fathers an opportunity to be heard in proceedings, to have their surname on 
the birth certificate, and to seek custody even after the child has been in an adoptive placement 
for an extended period of time. There are still challenges, especially with regards to the showing 
that an unwed biological father has to make to gain custody of his children when the mother 
consents to an adoption against his wishes. 
Despite the shortcomings, Canada is on the path to accepting unwed biological fathers ' 
parental rights based on biology alone, just as they do for biological mothers. Since Trociuk, 
there has been recognition that biological fathers have a dignity interest in their children, even 
141 !d. at ~95. 
1
"
12 Id. at ~104. 
143 Jd. at ~72. ("ParentaJ claims must not be lightly set aside, and they are entitled to serious consideration in 
tead\\ng any conclusion" ). 
144 Id. at ~67. 
Woyce 20 
absent a social relationship. Canada's system, even with contradictory results at times, is closer 
to parental equality than either the United States or Ireland. The Supreme Court of Canada's 
dignity analysis provides a tool, analogous to the fundamental interest already recognized in the 
United States, which could be used in conjunction with Equal Protection to protect the parental 
rights ofunwed biological fathers at the birth of the child. 
IV. Equal Protection, Combined With the Canadian Recognition 
of the Dignity Interest Created by a Biological Relationship, 
OtTers a Path Towards Parental Equality for Unwed Biological 
Fathers in the United States. 
The time is ripe for the United States Supreme Court to use Equal Protection to recognize 
and protect the parental rights of unwed biological fathers based on the biological relationship 
between father and child without requiring a social relationship. No other biological parent is 
required to show a social relationship before being legally recognized as a parent. The three 
systems discussed previously each recognize unwed mothers as per se capable of raising their 
children and require the mother's consent or a showing of neglect or abuse in order for the state 
to terminate the mother's parental rights. 145 Unwed mothers are given more than a right to notice 
or a right to petition to seek custody of their children. They are given the full panoply of parental 
rights as soon as they give birth. Unwed biological fathers are entitled to this same degree of 
protection under Equal Protection, because they have the same fundamental right (or dignity 
interest) to have at a minimum a legal relationship with their children. 
This paper has examined three separate models with differing views on how to treat the 
rights of unwed biological fathers. In Ireland, unwed biological fathers are afforded merely the 
right to petition to seek guardianship. They have no actual right to guardianship of their own 
children and no constitutional guarantees. Despite the European Court of Justice's finding that 
145 [1966] IR. 567 at 643-44 (Ireland does limit the Constitutional recognition of parental rights for unwed mothers). 
Woyce 21 
Ireland's restrictions violated the European Charter, Ireland has continued to restrict its view of 
family to the marital unit and to deny biological fathers legal recognition as parents. The United 
States has a test that is more open than Ireland but still restricts parental rights to a significant 
degree. The United States Supreme Court has laid out a biology plus test. This test requires that 
a biological as well as social relationship exist between the child and the biological father. 
Additionally, the court has said that only those rights that have traditionally been recognized are 
protected under due process and therefore the biological father may not have a protected interest 
where the mother is already married. The Canadian system has used the Charter freedoms to 
recognize a dignity interest in biological relationships between a father and his children. Canada 
has held that unwed biological father's have an interest in naming and knowing their children 
Gust as the children have an interest in knowing their biological fathers). Under this system, 
Canada has allowed petitions solely on biological grounds recognizing that in certain 
circumstances, a requirement of a social relationship is impossible, such as where the mother has 
attempted to keep the pregnancy and resulting birth from the biological father. Despite its more 
open system, Canada still requires more from unwed biological fathers who seek custody in 
adoption proceedings than it does from mothers whose rights the state seeks to terminate. Each 
system has built in inequalities that make it difficult, and in some cases impossible, for a 
biological father to be a legal parent or be granted custody of his biological children. Ultimately, 
the goal of this paper is to create a fourth model, one which recognizes the unwed biological 
father as a parent entitled to the same legal recognition as the biological mother. 
The United States has within its Constitution the ability to fully recognize and protect 
unwed biological fathers' as legal parents. Unlike Ireland where family is explicitly limited to 
the marital unit, the American Constitution protects under privacy a wide range of family-like 
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units. 146 The Equal Protection clause provides the United States Supreme Court ample latitude to 
protect unwed biological fathers, even though such rights were not traditionally protected in the 
past.147 Following the lead of Canada's Supreme Court's Charter decisions, which recognize a 
dignity interest analogous to the fundamental right concept in the United States, the United 
States should use the Equal Protection clause to recognize unwed biological fathers as equal to 
all other parents entitled to the same protection of their parental rights. 
Two routes are available for unwed biological fathers to challenge under Equal Protection 
their unequal status as parents. Unwed biological fathers could challenge statutes as creating 
unequal gender-based classifications between unwed biological fathers and unwed biological 
mothers. If the Court were to take this route, it would have at its disposal the heightened scrutiny 
analysis used when dealing with gender classifications. 148 In the past, states have claimed that 
the distinctions between these classes are related to the different care-giving functions between 
biological mothers and biological fathers. In Stanley, the dissent suggested that because 
biological fathers are usually unable or unwilling to care for their children, the different 
treatment was justified. States have also pointed to administrative functions, such as the ease of 
finding biological mothers and the difficulty of pointing to biological fathers, to justify different 
treatment. These interests would be insufficient under a heightened scrutiny analysis149. States 
may also attempt to rely on the interest pointed to in the Canadian cases, an interest in facilitating 
adoptive placements for children. Just as in Canada, this justification will fail in the United 
States, because parents have a fundamental right to raise their children that cannot be supplanted 
146 
supra nl. 
147 The Court today recognizes and protects many family and private relationships that were not protected 
traditionally. E.g. see, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558. (homosexual conduct;, Romerv. Evans, 517 U.S. 620. 
(homosexual relationship}; Lovingv. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (interracial marriage). 
148 Craig, 429 U.S. 190. 
149 Craig, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be 
substantially related to achievement of those objectives). 
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except where there is a showing of parental unfitness or a compelling state interest.150 A 
challenge of a statute that gives biological mothers per se parental rights but requires biological 
fathers to meet some further showing of a relationship is unequal treatment. This requirement, 
although previously accepted, should be rejected. Neither the biological mother nor the 
biological father should be required to show anymore than that they are biologically related to 
the child in order to be recognized under the law as a legal parent. 
Under current law, for the mother to maintain her parental rights in a termination 
proceeding, the burden rests on the state to show that she has abandoned, neglected, or abused 
her child. The biological father, on the other hand, has the burden of showing that he has created 
a social relationship worthy of state protection. This additional burden for the biological father 
to be a legally recognized parent is unequal, and through the analysis used by Canada in Trocuik 
and its progeny, the United States Supreme Court could find an Equal Protection violation. The 
Canadian court recognized that none of the state interests were as compelling as the biological 
father's right to be legally recognized as a parent of his child. The Canadian Courts have further 
recognized that there is no method that the state can take to lessen the impact on the interest of 
the father. The interest a biological father has in being a legal parent is no less here in the United 
States than in Canada. Like Canada, the United States should recognize that the biological 
relationship creates the interest that is protected and relegate the social relationship test to the 
custody decision where it belongs. 
The social relationship test that is currently used in the United States as part of the 
analysis to decide whether a biological father has parental rights and may veto an adoption is 
wrongly placed. The social relationship should be, and is, relevant only when there is a question 
about the custody of the child between the biological parents. However, where the biological 
150 Santovsky, 455 U.S. 745. 
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father seeks custody of his child as against a third party, the best interest of the child standard is 
not a proper analysis. The biological connection between father and child should be sufficient 
for the father to gain custody as against any third party151 , just as it is sufficient for a biological 
mother to keep her child as against any third party absent a showing of parental unfitness. 
Biological relationships should create a presumption entitling biological parents to custody 
against the entire world except the other biological parent, just as it does for married couples. 
When the decision is between two biological parents the best interest of the child standard is 
required to look at the social relationship as both parties are equally biologically related to the 
child. 
One argument often used to deny unwed biological fathers of parental rights is that 
women too are required to form a relationship with the child, and this is done during the 
pregnancy. It is true that women have a right to choose whether or not to reproduce and that 
such a decision ultimately impacts their body. During the pregnancy the woman by necessity 
will form a relationship with the child that the biological father simply can not. In Canada, the 
Supreme Court rejected the idea that pregnancy entitles the mother post birth to additional rights. 
The balance during pregnancy is fundamentally different than the balance once the child is born. 
After birth, the interests of the biological father are equal to those of the biological mother. Once 
a child is born, both parents sit in the same biological position towards the child, and their 
respective parental rights should be equal. 
Unwed biological fathers could also use a second, though more circuitous and perilous 
route to challenge their status under Equal Protection. Unwed biological fathers could bring a 
direct challenge on the classification between married and unmarried biological fathers, an issue 
151 [2007] S.J. No. 30; 2007 SKQB 36, at ~29-56. (requiring more than being "adequate, for biological father to 
have custody against an adoptive family). 
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that has been avoided by the Supreme Court. The classification challenged would be marital 
status rather than gender. On at least two prior occasions, the Court has found that the question 
was either not presented or the case could be disposed of without reaching this issue. A case that 
squarely put this question before the court could lead to unwed biological fathers being granted 
legal recognition as parents to the same degree as married men. 
This road would be more arduous in that the heightened scrutiny analysis that is afforded 
gender classifications would not be available. Without heightened scrutiny, the state would 
merely need to provide a rational basis for treating married and unmarried biological fathers 
differently. This test is notoriously easy for the state to meet and would provide a serious 
challenge for unwed biological fathers to show that the state interest is "irrational.,, Despite the 
lower standard, an unwed biological father could point to the European Court of Justices 
decision in Keegan v. Ireland that found that denying a biological father rights based on marital 
status violated the European Charter. The Supreme Court could also look to the Trociuk case in 
Canada and the dignity interest that all biological fathers share with their children. The 
compelling nature of the interest might offer unwed biological fathers the ability to overcome the 
burden imposed by a lower standard of scrutiny. 
This challenge would have to focus on the disparity of treatment between the unmarried 
and the married (or more closely related, divorced) father. The married or divorced father does 
not need to have a social relationship with his children in order to be considered a parent. The 
biological ties and a legal (or former legal) relationship with the child,s mother is sufficient. The 
unwed father has the same biological relationship to his children as a married father. The only 
difference then is the formalization of the relationship between the parents which the court has 
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said is not required for the attachment of parental rights. 152 The Supreme Court has also 
recognized that when fundamental liberty interests were at issue, the state could not discriminate 
on marital status. 153 
Some have argued that recognition of the parental rights of unwed biological fathers, who 
are not in committed relationships with the mother or who have not formed a relationship with 
the child, infringes upon the rights of the mother and is not in the best interest of the child. 154 
These arguments presuppose that the parental relationship is synonymous with custody of the 
child. There is no doubt that where a biological father is unfit, the parental relationship can be 
terminated or that visitation can be limited or denied just as it can be for a mother who is unfit. 
Where the biological mother or the state child welfare agency thinks that it is not in the best 
interests of the child to have a relationship with the father, the court would be able to make a 
determination to sever the parental rights or limit custody. The right asserted in this paper, 
however, would mean the father would not have to prove his fitness or to show that he is better 
than an adoptive parent in order to be recognized as a legal parent of his children. By nature of 
biology alone, the same rights that attach to the mother would attach to the biological father, 
regardless of marital status, and he would be entitled to the same procedure as all other parents 
for those rights to be terminated. This would make unwed biological fathers legal parents 
recognized by law whether or not they seek custody or a social relationship. 
152 Stanley. 405 U.S. 645. 
153 Eisenstadt v. Barid, 405 U.S. 438, 453. (marital status can •t be used to refuse unmarried women the right to 
contraceptives). 
154 E. Gary Spitko, The Constitutional Function of Biological Paternity: Evidence of the Biological Mother's 
Consent to the Biological Father's Co-parenting of Her Child, 48 Ariz. L. Rev. 97 (2006). (would require social 
relationship and consent of the mother for biological father to be a parent). 
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Conclusion 
Unwed biological fathers as a class have been denied legal recognition as a parent of their 
children without a showing that they are unfit. Despite the changing look of families, the 
increase of children born out of wedlock, and the changing societal views on paternal 
involvement in child care, unwed biological fathers are treated as strangers to their children 
unless and until they show a social relationship sufficient to satisfy a court. The United States 
needs to reject such a narrow conception of parent, refuse to recognize distinctions on marital 
status or gender, and provide legal recognition of unwed biological fathers under the Equal 
Protection clause. Canada provides a framework through its dignity analysis that the United 
States can use to guide its Equal Protection analysis of either gender or marital status 
classifications. 
Recognizing and protecting at birth the unwed biological fathers' parental right does 
more than grant men the right to consent or veto adoptions; it provides children the universal 
right to know both of their biological parents and an opportunity to foster a relationship that 
under our current law is forever denied. Most importantly, recognizing unwed biological fathers 
as parents at birth fulfills the promise of the Equal Protection clause by recognizing both 
biological parents biological relationship with the child as equal before the law. 
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